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Article 4

ADMINISTRATIVE INJURIES
MATTHEW STANFORD
ABSTRACT

This Article seizes upon the precarious position of administrative agencies. As White
House aides call for the "deconstructionof the administrativestate" and judicial nominees
flaunt their anti-Chevron credentials before the Senate JudiciaryCommittee, the thought of
an impending test of New Deal reforms is no longer a matter of if, but when. This Article offers
a new, more robust framework for courts to consider as litigants take aim at agencies' adjudicative role. Specifically, it addresses the longstanding, yet incredibly porous doctrine of
public rights and suggests that a modest analytical supplement-administrativeinjurieswould go a long way toward preserving this critical agency function while simultaneously
harmonizing public rights with well-established Article III doctrines of justiciability. This
Article seeks to make a useful, immediate contributionto academic and policy discussions, as
well as the litigation strategies of those tasked with defending the adjudicativerole of administrative agencies.
I. IN TR O D U CT ION .....................................................................................................
II. THE PUBLIC R IGHTS D OCTRINE ...........................................................................
A . The Daw n of Public R ights...........................................................................
B . Digg ing for B edrock ......................................................................................
1. Pragmatism us. Predictability...............................................................
2. Sch or's S lid ing S cale..............................................................................
3. In S earch of an A nchor ..........................................................................
III. AN U NSATISFACTORY STATUS QUO .....................................................................
A . S overeign Im m u n ity .....................................................................................
B . The R ight-Privilege D ichotomy ....................................................................
IV . A DM INISTRATIVE INJU RIES ..................................................................................
A . N o Injury, N o S tand ing ................................................................................
B . A lm ost, B u t Not R ip e ....................................................................................
C. The Political Question of Agency Policy.......................................................
1. Agency Action as Policy Determination.................................................
2. Justiciabilityand the Need for Deference .............................................
3. Spanning the Legal-PoliticalD ivide .....................................................
D . Why Adm inistrative Injuries Matter............................................................
V.

C O N CL U SIO N ........................................................................................................

I.

12 9
133

133
134
135
139
142
145

146
148
152

153
155
157
158
160
163
165
16 6

INTRODUCTION

Denise lives in Oakland and works in San Francisco. On a typical
morning it takes her an hour to get to work. But today, Denise is running late, and she has a morning meeting with a big client. The meeting starts in thirty minutes, and traffic on the Bay Bridge is awful. As
* Matthew J. Stanford is a California attorney and Senior Research Fellow at the
California Constitution Center at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law. He
received his B.A. (2012) from the Pennsylvania State University and his J.D. (2017) from the
University of California, Berkeley School of Law. He wishes to thank his wife, Julianne, for
her abiding love, patience, and encouragement. He also owes a special thanks to Professor
Andrew D. Bradt, Carmel Dooling, Matthew Ladew, and Priya Purohit for their thoughtful
feedback. Finally, he wishes to thank the FSU Law Review editorial board for its professionalism and diligence throughout the publication process. All views expressed and any errors
are the author's.
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she waits her turn in the FasTrak queue, Denise looks to her right and
notices the bypass lane for carpoolers. Fearing the repercussions of being tardy, she looks left, then right; and seeing no highway patrol officers around, Denise pulls into the carpool bypass lane and heads for
the bridge. Just as Denise thinks she is home free, her heart sinks as
she sees blue lights flashing in her rearview mirror. She pulls over to
the side of the road, and a highway patrol officer walks to her car and
writes her a ticket for violating the carpool lane law. They are both on
their way in a matter of minutes.
The police practice of summarily ticketing traffic law violators is a
commonly accepted one. But its uncontroversial reputation is something of a misnomer in the world of administrative law. Though we
associate police officers as law enforcers, commonly accepted exercises
of police power like this regularly verge into what the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)' would undoubtedly consider adjudicative.2 Were
the Federal Trade Commission to impose fines on businesses for antitrust violations with equal rapidity to that of the highway patrol officer, one would likely question the merits of such a process. A denial
of Social Security benefits without an agency explanation of ineligibility would face similar criticism. Granted, the normative reasons for
this contrast are numerous, socially accepted, and logically sound.
Higher financial risks or increased evidentiary demands, for instance,
reasonably explain the need for more process in certain settings but
not in others. Yet all of these actions are adjudicative-at least in the
administrative sense.
But what about in an Article III sense: do such adjudicative mechanisms of law enforcement amount to an exercise of "the judicial power
of the United States"? 3 Perhaps not.
The dawn of the administrative state marked a pivotal moment in
American history.4 Before the rise of administrative agencies, Article
III was thought to operate with relative simplicity: The judicial power
1.

See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012).

2. Put simply, the APA defines an "adjudication" as an "agency process for the formulation of an order." Id. § 551(7). An "order" includes "the whole or a part of a final disposition,
whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter
other than rule making but including licensing." Id. § 551(6). An order may impose a "sanction," which includes the "imposition of [a] penalty or fine." Id. § 551(10)(C). When a law
enforcement officer issues a citation imposing a penalty or fine--which is subject to judicial
review should the recipient choose to challenge the fine--the means by which an officer
gathers evidence and determines that such a sanction is necessary is adjudicative.

3.
4.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dis-

senting) ("The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal
trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by their decisions than
by those of all the courts, review of administrative decisions apart.").
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it conferred was exercised wholly and exclusively by the judicial
branch.' The addition of a "fourth branch" thus threatened to upend
the constitutional presumption of three coequal branches. 6 The Supreme Court in turn has struggled to find a constitutional home for
regulatory agencies. At risk of oversimplification, the Court has done
so by finding that certain exercises of executive, legislative, and judicial power by these entities are sufficiently quasi-executive/legislative/judicial to survive scrutiny.' It would appear that such quasi-ness
leaves the constitutional separation of powers intact.
The Supreme Court's desire to define and cabin the seemingly judicial power of these non-Article III bodies stems from a valid concern. Article III of the Constitution vests "[t]he judicial power of the
United States .

.

. in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts,

as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." And
for good reason. Only Article III judges are constitutionally afforded
the life tenure and compensation protection that the Founders
deemed indispensable to the integrity of an independent judiciary.9
The exercise of judicial power by administrative agencies thus poses
a special challenge. Beyond the literal affront to Article III's text,
such exercises of judicial power place these bodies at risk of precisely
the type of abuse that inspired the inclusion of Article III in the constitutional scheme.
A major theory by which the Supreme Court has attempted to assuage these concerns has been its distinction of cases involving the
5. See id. at 487-88.
6. See id. at 487 (stating that the administrative state "has deranged our three-branch
legal theories much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional
thinking").
7. See id. at 487-88 ("Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative,
quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions
within the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down,
and 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed."); see also F. Scott Boyd, How the Exception Makes the Rule:
Agency Waiver of Statutes, Rules, and Precedent in Florida, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 287, 288
(1995) ("The rise of the administrative state has brought new complications to our quest for
justice. Concluding that the complex world demands complex legislation, we have reluctantly
condoned broad delegation of 'quasi-legislative' powers to administrative agencies who are
supposed to fill in the details. Concluding that experience with general principles of law and
equity do not give courts necessary expertise, we have similarly approved the delegation of
'quasi-judicial' powers." (footnotes omitted)).
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
9. See id. cl. 2; Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011) ("In establishing the system
of divided power in the Constitution, the Framers considered it essential that 'the judiciary
remain[ truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive.'" (citation omitted)); see
also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) (listing among its grievances
the dependence of the judiciary upon the will of the British crown for its livelihood).

132

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:129

adjudication of "public rights" from those of "private rights."o At its
most basic level, the argument proceeds with syllogistic ease: While
resolution of private-rights cases requires an Article III court, adjudication of public rights matters does not. Because the rights adjudicated
by administrative tribunals are public rights, agency adjudications are
constitutional." But the foundation of this legal fiction is hardly satisfying. Courts reason that public rights cases do not require an Article
III court because the rights are revocable, but a right's revocable nature scarcely offers a basis for diminished constitutional protection. 2
The State's potential use of sovereign immunity is a similarly unreliable reasoning.1 3 Nevertheless, these reasons remain the theoretical underpinnings of this dichotomization of legal rights.14
This Article furnishes a new foundation for distinguishing between
public rights and private rights: administrative injuries. With the help
of the examples above, this Article suggests that the appropriate distinction between public and private rights is one of justiciability. The
constitutional permissibility of agency adjudications is due not to the
underlying right's revocable nature or the State's potential immunity
from liability, but instead, from to the absence of a ripe, concrete, Article III injury at that time. Only after the agency's "adjudicative"1 5
process is complete has a claimant suffered a concrete "injury in fact"
that is "fairly . .. traceable" to that agency and therefore "likely . .. [to

be] redressed by a favorable decision" from an Article III court through
judicial review.' 6 Thus, the Constitution does not merely tolerate the
initial adjudication of public rights by agencies; it demands nothing
less. Without an administrative injury, a claimant in a public rights
matter lacks a justiciable case or controversy. The adjudicative power
that administrative agencies exercise relative to public rights matters
is not "the judicial power of the United States." It is something else
entirely."
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II explains the public
rights rationale that the Supreme Court uses to justify agency
10. See infra Part II.
11. See id.
12. See infra Part III.B.
13. See infra Part I.A.
14. See infra Part III.
15. The author places the term "adjudication" in quotations to make an important distinction. As discussed in greater detail below, an agency adjudication is a creature of statute that
arguably must be distinct from an adjudication that an Article III court performs in its exclusive exercise of "the judicial power of the United States." See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
16. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. The author acknowledges that the traffic ticket example used in this Article would typically involve a State agency action that is bound neither
by the APA nor the justiciability doctrines that limit federal jurisdiction. This Article proceeds as though state courts are bound by the same justiciability requirements.
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adjudication of such matters. Part III discusses the two bases that are
most often relied upon to support this rationale and explains why they
fail to survive the analytical rigor demanded of any steadfast constitutional doctrine. Part IV presents the theory of administrative injuries:
a completed agency adjudication is necessary to make public rights
claims justiciable in an Article III court.
II. THE PUBLIC RIGHTS DOCTRINE
An understanding of the public/private rights distinction is essential to any assessment of the public rights doctrine's analytical foundation. Unfortunately, the text of Article III offers minimal guidance
concerning the proper structuring of the federal judiciary. Aside from
requiring "one Supreme Court" and establishing life tenure and salary
protection for its judges, Article III largely leaves judicial organization
to Congress and-for better or worse-to the courts themselves.
A.

The Dawn of Public Rights

The concept of public rights falls into the second category, finding
its origins in the landmark case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
and Improvement Co.' 9 There, the Supreme Court considered the Article III permissibility of a statute allowing the Treasury Department to
issue and execute "warrant[s] of distress."2 0 These warrants allowed
for the liquidation of the property of tax collectors to satisfy balances
found to be owed to the United States.2 ' The challenger in Murray's
Lessee argued that this process violated due process and undermined
the constitutional separation of powers.22 Specifically, he maintained
that the issuance and execution of such warrants was an exercise of
judicial power reserved to Article III judges. 2 3
The Court disagreed. Noting the "nearly or quite universal use" of
distress warrants both before and after the adoption of the Fifth
Amendment, Justice Curtis quickly disposed of the Due Process claim
as a long-accepted act of the executive. 24 Turning separately to the Article III issue, the Court rejected the argument that the statutory
scheme providing for the issuance and execution of distress warrants
had placed such matters exclusively within the province of the

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See U.S. CONST. art. III.
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
Id. at 274-75.
Id.
Id. at 275-76.
Id.
Id. at 277-80.
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judiciary. 5 Though the law did permit debtors to seek judicial relief
following the execution of such warrants, Justice Curtis noted an "essential element" missing from the challenger's argument.2 6 Beyond the
mistaken assumption that congressional will is irrelevant to whether
a matter is judicial, the argument disregarded United States' status
as a party.27 The statute's provision of a judicial remedy for the unlawful execution of distress warrants was hardly necessary in light of the
government's immunity from suit. By establishing a post-collection
remedy, Congress was merely "plac[ing] the government upon the
same ground which is occupied by private persons who proceed to take
extrajudicial remedies for their wrongs, and they may do so to such
extent, and with such restrictions, as may be thought fit."2 8 In a word,
the judicial remedy was an act of "legislative grace," 2 9 not constitutional imperative. Justice Curtis continued:
To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it
proper to state that we do not consider congress can either withdraw
from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor,
on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter
which, from its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination.
At the same time there are matters, involving public rights, which
may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of
acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination,
but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of
the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper. 30
And so, the legal fiction of public rights was born. Following its debut,
however, this newly forged frontier would lay largely dormant for the
better part of a century-that is, until President Roosevelt's New Deal
would spark a public rights renaissance.
B. Digging for Bedrock
The New Deal started a conversation in which public rights promised to play a more lasting role. Its sweeping reforms drew particular
concern about the force and scope of federal power, as well as its
proper allocation among the coordinate branches. 3 ' The advent of
25. Id. at 282-84.
26. Id. at 283.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 284.
29. Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's
Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 792 (1986).
30. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284 (emphasis added).
31. See Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
425 (1987) ("The New Deal set out a different conception of legal rights, rejecting common
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administrative agencies presented questions about the line dividing
"the judicial power of the United States" from the adjudicatory role
of these new regulatory bodies.32 Yet as the following cases illustrate,
an uncertain foundation has come to limit the public rights doctrine's
reliability.
1. Pragmatismvs. Predictability
In 1932, the Supreme Court decided Crowell v. Benson. 33 There, the
Court considered the constitutionality of an administrative scheme by
which an agency would adjudicate workers' compensation claims.34 Invoking Murray'sLessee, the Court made short work of the system's Article III legitimacy. Unlike the distress warrant framework at issue
there, the workers' compensation claim in Crowell was a private-rights
dispute between employee and employer. 3 5 Such cases, the Court concluded, must be resolved by an Article III court. 36
Nevertheless, the Crowell Court explained that the legislative
scheme satisfied this requirement. 37 Though initial adjudication by an
administrative agency was required, and factual findings were to be
treated as final by reviewing courts, Article III interests remained intact given federal courts' continued authority over questions of law and
ability to review agency determinations of "jurisdictional facts." 3 8 This

arrangement, the Court concluded, "reliev[ed] the courts of a most serious burden while preserving their complete authority to insure the
proper application of the law." 3 9 But such a pragmatic gloss on Mur-

ray's Lessee's more categorical framework would give the Court pause

law and status quo baselines for deciding what constituted governmental 'action' and 'inaction'; it proposed a dramatically different conception of the presidency and a novel set of
administrative actors; and it rejected traditional notions of federalism."); id. at 430 ("The
New Deal was a self-conscious revision of the original constitutional arrangement of checks
and balances, and some of the problems of modern regulation are a product of the myopic
reaction of the New Deal reformers to the system of separated and divided powers.").
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
33. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
34. Id. at 36-37.
35. Id. at 37, 49-51.
36. Id. at 50-51.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 62-63 ("In the absence of any provision as to the finality of the determination
by the deputy commissioner of the jurisdictional fact of employment, the statute is open to
the construction that the court in determining whether a compensation order is in accordance with law may determine the fact of employment which underlies the operation of the
statute."); see id. at 51-54 ("[T]he reservation of full authority to the court to deal with matters of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of
cases.").
39. Id. at 54.
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five decades later in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co. 4 0

Northern Pipelinepresented a special challenge concerning the authority of bankruptcy judges. 4 1 In the process of invalidating certain
portions the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as contrary to Article III, the
Court specified "three narrow situations" in which an Article III court
was not required-"each recognizing a circumstance in which the
grant of power to the Legislative and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the congressional assertion of a power to create legislative courts was consistent with, rather
than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separation of powers."42 The first of these exceptions was "territorial courts," which Congress created pursuant to its "complete power" under Article IV to govern the territories and, by logical extension, the District of Columbia. 4 3
The second exception was for military courts. 4 4 As with territorial
courts, Justice Brennan observed for the four-justice plurality, Congress's "extraordinary control" over such tribunals could be readily inferred from Article I's grant of power to establish and regulate the nation's military forces, the Fifth Amendment's "express exception" for
military cases, and Article II's recognition of the President as Commander in Chief.4 5

The plurality then turned to the third exception: the adjudication
of public-rights matters by legislative courts and administrative agencies. 4 6 Though partially justified by the longstanding notion that the
government may condition any waiver of sovereign immunity, public
rights were also predicated on the separation of powers principle that
certain issues, though judicial in appearance, had been constitutionally committed to one of the political branches. 4 7 The plurality declined
to offer any definitive guidance for courts to discern the difference, except to say that such matters "must at a minimum arise 'between the
government and others.' "48 What the plurality did provide was a partial explanation of the theoretical basis for the doctrine's existence.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67.

47. See id. at 67-68 ("The public-rights doctrine in grounded in a historically recognized
distinction between matters that could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches and matters that are 'inherently . . judicial.'" (citation omitted)).

48. Id. at 69 (quoting Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
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The plurality offered two key justifications. The first, as noted
above, was sovereign immunity: "[T]he Government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued," including the resolution of such disputes before non-Article III tribunals. 4 9 "But the public-rights doctrine
also draws upon the principle of separation of powers, and a historical
understanding that certain prerogatives were reserved to the political
Branches of Government," 5 0 Justice Brennan continued. Put differently, there are certain contexts, albeit undefined, that the Founders
purportedly left Congress free to resort to a "less drastic expedient" to
resolve such claims.5
52
The result, as several scholars noted following Northern Pipeline,
was an uncertain Article III terrain. While the identification of territorial and military courts was straightforward, the contours of the
public rights doctrine remained elusive. Nevertheless, instead of solidifying those doctrinal boundaries three years later in Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Products Co., the Court chose a path of greater
elasticity. 53

Union Carbide involved an Article III challenge to a statutory
scheme by which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administered the registration of pesticides. 54 The law created a right by
which initial registrants could recover compensation from "follow-on
registrants," who benefited from the original registration data.5 5 However, the law required claimants to submit their claims to binding arbitration.56 Though the arbitration was between private parties, the
Court chose to look "beyond form to the substance" of the statutory
framework.5 7 Noting the close resemblance between the compensation
right here and other public rights, Justice O'Connor determined that
Congress had the power "to authorize an agency administering a

49.

Id. at 67-68 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.

(18 How.) 272, 283-85 (1856); Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 452).
50. See id. at 67.
51. Id. at 68.
52. See, e.g., Young, supra note 29, at 850 ("The plurality's opinion in NorthernPipeline
leaves us wondering about precisely what subset of litigation involving rights created by
Congress constitutes the public-rights subset."); Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, AdministrativeAgencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 204 (1983)
("The NorthernPipeline decision creates serious and acute problems for Congress and for the
future of all federal bankruptcy adjudication. Of considerably greater concern, however, are
the implications for the conceptual basis on which to determine the proper scope of the 'judicial power' to be exercised by non-article III bodies." (footnote omitted)).

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
Id. at 568.
Id. at 571-72, 574-75.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 589.
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complex regulatory scheme to allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the program without providing an Article III adjudication." 8 Meanwhile, although the law did not rely on the judiciary
for its enforcement, the Court found that the scheme's provision permitting Article III review for "fraud, misconduct, [and] misrepresentation," as well as for "constitutional error" adequately respected the "appropriate exercise of the judicial function."5 9 So long as Congress is acting within its Article I powers, Congress is free to "create a seemingly
'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary."6 0
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan supplemented the
majority's holding with some prospective guidance.6 ' Deeming the
Northern Pipelineframework "sufficiently flexible to accommodate the
demands of contemporary Government while preserving the constitutional system of checks and balances," Justice Brennan suggested that
the compensation scheme here was in fact a public right.6 2 While the
arbitration was between private parties, the scheme by which the dispute was administered was effectively dominated by the federal government. 6 3 In a sense, the ability of "follow-on registrants" to use prior
registration data could be considered a government service that requires a fee to compensate initial registrants for their efforts. 6 4 "As
such it partakes of the characteristics of a standard agency adjudica-

tion [of public rights]

"65

The public rights doctrine after Union Carbide remained something
of an enigma. Though Justice Brennan sought to unambiguously classify the legislative scheme as a public rights matter, he again chose to
forego providing any concrete doctrinal parameters. To the contrary,
he introduced a flexibility that suggests the only limit on public rights
is Congress's imagination.6 6 And the Court's resolution of Commodity

58. Id.
59. Id. at 592.
60. Id. at 593-94.
61.

Id. at 594-601 (Brennan, J., concurring).

62. Id. at 600.
63. See id. ("[T]he dispute arises in the context of a federal regulatory scheme that virtually occupies the field.").

64.

See id. at 600-01.

65.

Id. at 601 (citation omitted).

66. See id. at 600-02 ("So long as this delegation is constitutionally permissible-an
issue left open on remand-and judicial review to ensure that the arbitrator's exercise of
authority in any given case does not depart from the mandate of the delegation, the Judiciary
will exercise a restraining authority sufficient to meet whatever requirements Art. III might
impose in the present context.").
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Futures Trading Commission v. Schor" the following year would do
little to level the landscape.
2. Schor's Sliding Scale
Schor involved a challenge to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission's (CFTC) authority to adjudicate a broker's state law
counterclaim against a claimant who sought reparations under the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)-the statute that the CFTC is
charged with enforcing.68 Preferring contextual flexibility to doctrinal
"coherence," the majority recognized three factors-"none of which has
been deemed determinative"-by which to assess the CEA's Article III
credentials.69 These factors included:
[T]he extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are
reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which
the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts[;] the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated[;] and the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article II.VO
From there, the Court found that the CFTC's initial adjudication of the
broker's counterclaim amounted to what was at most a "de minimis"
encroachment of Article III." Writing once more for the majority, Justice O'Connor noted the agency's subject-matter expertise, the law's
requirement of a district court order for enforcement of agency awards,
the provision for de novo review of the agency's determinations, and
the agency's generally limited adjudicatory power all as important
checks against potential impingement.72 She then turned to the private character of the broker's counterclaim, which was "incidental to,
and completely dependent upon," the resolution of the claimant's reparations claim. 73 Though such claims are entitled to an Article III
court, the statutory scheme's elective character, provision for significant Article III supervision, and appropriate legislative purpose made
any remaining concerns of encroachment extraneous.74
Schor's impact on the public rights doctrine is critical. Justice
O'Connor reiterated the relative unimportance of the public-private

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

478 U.S. 833 (1986).
Id. at 835-38.
Id. at 851.
Id. (quoting Union CarbideAgric. Prods., 473 U.S. at 587, 589-93).
Id. at 856.
See id. at 852-53.
Id. at 856.
See id. at 853-55.
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right dichotomy to Article III line-drawing.15 So long as the agency's adjudicative function possesses an adequate level of "quasi-ness," the danger of encroachment is at its nadir.7 6 Some scholars suggest that even
public rights matters may require at least some Article III oversight
post-Schor.7 7 Though public rights still appear to be relegated to a "second class status"78 in this sense, Justice O'Connor again declined to explain precisely which rights are properly considered public rights.
Now finding himself in dissent, Justice Brennan made one final attempt to pick up the pieces that remained of Northern Pipeline. He
again outlined the "three narrow exceptions" to Article III's vestment
of judicial power in the judiciary: territorial courts, courts-martial, and
courts that adjudicate public rights.7 9 Justice Brennan's framework
"would limit the judicial authority of non-Article III federal tribunals
to these few, long-established exceptions and would countenance no
further erosion of Article III's mandate."80 The damage was already
done. With Schor, the Court appeared to forever foreclose Justice
Brennan's notion of three neatly crafted exceptions in favor of a more
pragmatic, functional assessment of the statutory scheme.
But Justice Brennan would get one more chance to shape the public
rights landscape three years later. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,8 ' the Supreme Court was asked whether a party is entitled to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment when a fraudulent money
transfer claim is brought against them by a Chapter 11 trustee, even
though they have not made a claim against the bankruptcy estate.8 2
Responding to this question, Justice Brennan's majority opinion explained that while Congress may assign claims that are "closely analogous to common-law claims" to non-jury forums, its ability to do so is
limited to matters involving public rights. 83 Thus, to answer the

75. See id. at 853-54 ("[T]his Court has rejected any attempt to make determinative
for Article III purposes the distinction between public rights and private rights . .. . [T]he
public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that could be conclusively determined
by the Executive and Legislative Branches, the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is less than when private rights, which are normally within the purview of the judiciary, are relegated as an initial matter to administrative adjudication." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).

76.

See id.

77.

Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Government Benefits and the Rule of Law:

Toward a Standards-BasedTheory of JudicialReview, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 499, 511-12 (2006).
78. Id. at 511.
79. Schor, 478 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
82. Id. at 36.
83.

Id. at 52-53. Justice Brennan continued:
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Seventh Amendment question, the Court first needed to determine
whether the fraudulent conveyance claim involved public rights.8 4
Conceding Union Carbide'srejection of Northern Pipeline's threshold
test for public rights based on the government's presence as a party,
Justice Brennan explained that some actions between private parties
still involve public rights." In such cases, the "crucial question" is
whether the right, though "seemingly private," is nevertheless "so
closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme" that agency adjudication is permissible, provided there is some Article III supervision."
Absent such integration, matters between private parties require adjudication by an Article III court."
In a concurrence, Justice Scalia pushed back on the majority's expansive reading of the public rights doctrine.8 8 Refusing to join that
part of the opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the contemporary view that
the government need not be a party to a public rights matter.89 He began with the text of Article III, whose unambiguous vestment of judicial power in the judiciary "admits of no exceptions."90 But alas, Murray's Lessee created one anyway-namely, that matters involving public rights may be assigned to non-Article III bodies if Congress so
chooses. 9' Hoping to limit Murray'sLessee to a single bright-line exception, Justice Scalia offered a less-than-tepid prognosis:
It is clear that what we meant by public rights were not rights
important to the public, or rights created by the public, but rights of
the public-thatis, rights pertaining to claims brought by or against
the United States. For central to our reasoning was the device of
[I]f a statutory cause of action is legal in nature, the question whether the Sev-

enth Amendment permits Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal that
does not employ juries as factfinders requires the same answer as the question
whether Article III allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause of action
to a non-Article III tribunal. . . . Conversely, if Congress may assign the adjudication of a statutory cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal, then the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by
a nonjury factfinder.
Id. at 53-54.
84. Id. at 54.
85. Id.
86. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. See id. at 54-55.
88. Id. at 65 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89. Id. at ("In my view a matter of public rights, whose adjudication Congress may assign to tribunals lacking the essential characteristics of Article III courts, must at a minimum arise between the government and others. . . . Until quite recently this has also been
the consistent view of the Court." (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)).
90. Id. at 66.
91. Id.
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waiver of sovereign immunity, as a means of converting a subject
which, though its resolution involved a "judicial act," could not be
brought before the courts, into the stuff of an Article III "judicial
controversy." Waiver of sovereign immunity can only be implicated,
of course, in suits where the Government is a party. We understood
this from the time the doctrine of public rights was born, in 1856,
until two Terms ago, saying as recently as 1982 that the suits to
which it applies "must at a minimum arise 'between the government

and others.'

"92

Finding no constitutional footing for the Court's departure from Murray's Lessee after Northern Pipeline, Justice Scalia rejected the Court's
contemporary view that the constitutional separation of powers can be
maintained by case-by-case, pragmatic assessments. 9 3 Such a fundamental constitutional theme "must be anchored in rules, not set adrift
in some multifactored 'balancing test'-and especially not in a test
that contains as its last and most revealing factor 'the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.' "94
3.

In Search of an Anchor

Justice Scalia would later find limited solace in Stern v. Marshall.5
Like Granfinanciera,Stern addressed the constitutional limits on the
power of bankruptcy courts to issue final judgments on state-law counterclaims that "augment" the bankruptcy estate despite their tenuous
relationship to the underlying bankruptcy.9 6 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Roberts found that the absence of Article III salary and
tenure protections for bankruptcy judges prevented them from entering final judgment on such claims. 97 Although the Court compared this
counterclaim to the one in Granfinanciera,it failed to distinguish it.
The Chief Justice instead reiterated Article III's check on Congress's
power to regulate bankruptcy proceedings: "the question is whether
the action at issue stems from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process."9 8 In a slow pivot
99
back toward Northern Pipeline,
the Court explained that the

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 68-69 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 69).
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 70.
564 U.S. 462 (2011).
Id. at 499.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 499.

99.

See Laura Ferguson, Revisiting the Public Rights Doctrine: Justice Thomas's Appli-

cation of Originalism to Administrative Law, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1315, 1323 (2016)
("[Chief Justice Roberts's] emphasis on the independence of the federal judiciary may have
signaled a new direction in the Court's jurisprudence: 'A statute may no more lawfully chip
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counterclaim in Stern failed to pass muster under "any of the varied
formulations of the public rights exception."'0 0 The right was not a
product of legislative grace historically committed to the discretion of
the political branches; rather, it was a function of a complex regulatory
scheme-limited by voluntary consent of the parties, or "completely
dependent upon" a regulatory agency adjudication.o' Nor were bankruptcy courts "experts" at resolving common-law tort claims. 0 2
But once more, the Court stopped short of offering the "concrete
guidance" that its previous decisions admittedly lacked.1 0 3 This case,
after all, concerned "the most prototypical exercise of judicial power:
the entry of a final, binding judgment by a court with broad substantive jurisdiction, on a common law cause of action, when the action
neither derives from nor depends upon any agency regulatory regime."104 To allow such a thing, the Chief Justice warned, would be a
bridge too far. 0 5
Concurring once more, Justice Scalia lamented the majority's reluctance to more definitively limit the public rights doctrine.'o He warned
that such a fact-intensive analysis "should arouse the suspicion that
something is seriously amiss with our jurisprudence in this area ."to7 In
Justice Scalia's mind, only "a firmly established historical practice"
should overcome the presumption that an Article III court must preside over a federal adjudication.0 s Those exceptions were territorial
courts, courts-martial, and "true" public rights matters.'09 Though
somewhat perplexing, especially coming from Justice Scalia, this qualifier likely referred to disputes in which the government was a party." 0
But the laundry list of Article III exceptions was not yet complete.

away at the authority of the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate it entirely.' " (quoting

Stern, 564 U.S. at 502-03)).
100. Stern, 564 U.S. at 493.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 493-94.
103. Id. at 494.
104. Id. at 494-95.
105. See id. at 495 ("If such an exercise of judicial power may nonetheless be taken from
the Article III Judiciary simply by deeming it part of some amorphous 'public right,' then
Article III would be transformed from the guardian of individual liberty and separation of
powers we have long recognized into mere wishful thinking.").

106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 503-05 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 504.
Id. at 504-05.
Id. at 505.

110. See id. at 503 ("[A] matter of public rights . .
must at a minimum arise between
the government and others." (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65

(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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In its more recent decision in Wellness InternationalNetwork, Ltd.
v. Sharif,"' the Court had an opportunity to place a firm limit on congressional delegations of adjudicatory power to non-Article III bodies.
When a bitter lawsuit left Sharif holding the bill for more than half-amillion dollars in attorney's fees, he filed for bankruptcy." 2 Still hoping
to recover its fees, Wellness made a claim against the bankruptcy estate and sought a declaratory judgment seeking a separate trust administered by Sharif to be treated as part of his bankruptcy estate." 3
Sharif neglected, however, to object on Article III grounds when the
bankruptcy court granted the declaratory judgment.11 4 The question
before the Supreme Court, then, was whether Sharifs passive consent
to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction amounted to a constitutionally
permissible waiver of his right to an Article III adjudicator."' The
Court said it did." 6 Expounding upon Schor's context-driven analysis,
Justice Sotomayor elected to forego "formalistic and unbending rules,"
choosing instead to consider the "practical effect" of allowing individual litigants to waive Article III."1 Given bankruptcy courts' strict
statutory limitations, considerable Article III oversight, and concentrated legal expertise, the Court saw little harm in permitting such
waivers to take place."'
Though the majority made no mention of public rights, Justice
Thomas dedicated a considerable portion of his dissent to defining
what he saw as the proper parameters of the decades-old, yet still elusory doctrine." 9 While the "[d]isposition of private rights to life, liberty,
and property falls within the core of the judicial power," public rights
lie somewhere beyond that core.1o Noting the considerable uncertainty
concerning its doctrinal parameters, Justice Thomas began with the
historical understanding of public rights.' 2 ' Unlike "the private unalienable rights of each individual," public rights are distinguished by
their generality.' 22 Such generality, he continued, relieved such rights
from the need for an Article III adjudicator.1 23 But that distinction has
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
Id. at 1940.
Id.
Id. at 1941.
See id. at 1939.
Id.
Id. at 1944.
See id. at 1944-46.
See id. at 1963-68 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1963.
Id. at 1964-66.
Id. at 1965 (emphasis omitted).

123.

See id. ("[W]hile the legislative and executive branches may dispose of public rights
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been "blurred" as the public-private rights dichotomy developed.1 2 4 Citing myriad exceptions that the Court has recognized over the years,
Justice Thomas characterized the status quo-epitomized by Union
Carbide's wishy-washy definition of public rights as those "so closely
integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III
judiciary"-as a response to doctrinal confusion.' 2 5 In Justice Thomas's
view, the proper antidote is the resurrection of the purportedly historical view. 2
Yet his call for a return to original intent offers little clarity.'2 7 A
return to the notion that public rights are defined by common possession as opposed to collective valuation2 still leaves the question of
identity largely unanswered. Moreover, the theoretical justifications
for such a doctrine in the first place fall by the wayside. Such a shift
would leave the proper scope of "the judicial power of the United
States"'2 9 no less precarious than it currently is. Thus, of greater import and urgency, this Article contends, is a theoretical foundation
upon which the notion of a public rights exception to Article III might
rest. Without one, the identification of such rights is a fool's errand,
and their historical understanding little more than an interesting
piece of trivia.
III. AN UNSATISFACTORY STATUS

QUO

This Part examines the two primary theoretical bases that have
been advanced in defense of the public rights exception: sovereign immunity and the right-privilege distinction. 3 0 These justifications are
at will-including through non-Article III adjudications-an exercise of the judicial power is
required 'when the government want[s] to act authoritatively upon core private rights that
had vested in a particular individual.'" (quoting Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political
Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 569 (2007)).
124. Id. at 1966.
125. Id. at 1967 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 59394 (1985)).
126. Id. at 1967-68.
127. See Ferguson, supra note 99, at 1328-29 ("Although there is a broad conception of
what the public rights doctrine encompasses, it is more difficult to identify its source. Justice
Thomas's dissents do little to clarify this discrepancy.").
128. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 68 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("It is clear that what we meant by public rights were not rights important to the public, or
rights created by the public, but rights of the public-that is, rights pertaining to claims
brought by or against the United States.").
129. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
130. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 952-53 (1988) (outlining three bases for the public rights
doctrine that are "in tension to varying degrees with modern sensibilities"). Fallon mentions
a third contemporary basis: administrative feasibility. Id. But this Article does not address
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unsatisfactory. Sovereign immunity may explain Congress's power to
create public rights, but it fails to resolve why sovereign immunity's
availability in other situations does not beget similar results. Defining
public rights as merely those finding their origins in legislative benevolence likewise leaves undefined what characteristics distinguish such
rights from those statutory rights that the Supreme Court has historically treated as private. Finding no satisfactory answers, this Article
offers an alternative theory in Part IV.
A.

Sovereign Immunity

The idea of sovereign immunity as a basis for public rights hearkens
back to Murray's Lessee itself. In order to sue the government, the sovereign must first waive its immunity. And when it does, the government
may condition the waiver on the use of a non-Article III tribunal.1 3 ' As
shown in the previous Part, though, the presence of the sovereign is no
longer a necessary predicate to being considered a public-rights matter.1 3 2 As Kenneth Coffin observes, even before Union Carbide, the
Court had begun "the process of unhinging the public rights doctrine
from the theory of sovereign immunity." 3 3 Looking to the example of
Williams v. United States,13 4 in which the Court of Claims-which
hears monetary claims against the United States-was found to rest
outside the confines of Article III, Coffin notes the "judicial sleight of
hand" by which Justice Sutherland used the presence of the federal
government to the benefit of the Court's holding while simultaneously
opening the door to a broader conception of public rights.1 35 Rather
than limiting the analysis to the government's status as a party, the
Court went a step further. Because the Court of Claims oversaw matters "equally susceptible of legislative or executive determination, they
are, of course, matters in respect of which there is no constitutional
that view. The aim of this Article is to refine the doctrinal basis for public rights, which a
purely pragmatic view inherently lacks. Accordingly, this Article's critique of the status quo
is limited to the two doctrinally based views that remain popular theoretical justifications
for the public rights doctrine today.
131.

See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,

283-85 (1856); see also Kenneth G. Coffin, Limiting Legislative Courts: ProtectingArticle III
from Article I Evisceration, 16 BARRY L. REV. 1, 5 (2011) (discussing the original use of sovereign immunity to anchor public rights disputes to those which include the federal government as a party).

132.

See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 569 (1985) ("In es-

sence, the 'public rights' doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches, the danger of encroaching on the judicial
powers is reduced.").
133.

Coffin, supra note 131, at 8.

134.

289 U.S. 553 (1933).

135.

Coffin, supra note 131, at 8-9.
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right to a judicial remedy, and the authority to inquire into and decide
them may constitutionally be conferred on a nonjudicial officer or
body." 3 6 Even if the federal government is not a party to the suit, the
Court seems to suggest that there may nevertheless be instances in
which the Constitution has assigned decisionmaking power to one of
the political branches. Indeed, earlier conceptions of public rights included claims by the government againstprivate citizens.13 7
Though apparent obsolescence alone suffices to call the sovereign
immunity theory into question, additional concerns persist. For instance, there is no explanation for the distinction between public
rights matters in which the federal government is a party and Bivens
actions against federal officials and agencies.1 3 8 As agents of the
United States, these individuals enjoy immunity-albeit to varying degreesl 39-as an extension of the logic that a suit against the sovereign's
agent (when he or she has acted as such) is a suit against the sovereign
itself.1 4 0 Nevertheless, the availability of Biuens relief is not governed
by the satisfaction of federally imposed conditions but by the degree of
intentionality or purposiveness of the official's allegedly unconstitutional action.14' The availability of judicial relief in this context is not

136.

Williams, 289 U.S. at 579-80 (citations omitted).

137. See Fallon, supra note 130, at 952 n.2 10 ("The concept of sovereign immunity cannot
account for all of the public rights doctrine, which historically involved certain claims by the
government against private parties.").
138. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971) (holding that federal officers and entities could be subject to suits for damages by way of an implied cause of action contained in the Fourth Amendment); accord Min-

neci v. Pollard, 656 U.S. 118, 123 (2012) (noting that "[Bivens] held that the Fourth Amendment implicitly authorized a court to order federal agents to pay damages to a person injured
by the agents'violation of the Amendment's constitutional strictures"); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 243-45 (1979) (permitting Bivens actions pursuant to the Fifth Amend-

ment); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-20 (1980) (Eighth Amendment).
139. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 809 (1982) (qualified immunity for
presidential aides); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (absolute immunity for the
President); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (absolute immunity for executive

officials); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 199-200 (1880) (legislative immunity for
members of Congress and their aides).

140.

See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 693 (1949) ("[I]n

a suit against an agency of the sovereign, it is not sufficient that he make such a claim. Since
the sovereign may not be sued, it must also appear that the action to be restrained or directed
is not action of the sovereign. The mere allegation that the officer, acting officially, wrongfully holds property to which the plaintiff has title does not meet that requirement. True, it
establishes a wrong to the plaintiff. But it does not establish that the officer, in committing
that wrong, is not exercising the powers delegated to him by the sovereign. If he is exercising
such powers, the action is the sovereign's and a suit to enjoin it may not be brought unless
the sovereign has consented.").

141.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009) (discussing the need to "plead and

prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose" to establish a Bivens cause of
action pursuant to the First Amendment or Fifth Amendment).
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the result of "legislative grace." 4 2 It is a constitutional creature that
exists independently of congressional prerogative.1 43
The unqualified language of Article III itself underscores one final
inconsistency. If the judicial power "shall be vested" in federal
courts,1 4 4 then the availability of sovereign immunity is inconsequential to the proper forum in which such power must be exercised-any
claim of immunity notwithstanding. While Congress is permitted to
condition a waiver of sovereign immunity upon certain concessions (for
example, foregoing punitive damages), a successful invocation of sovereign immunity still requires an exercise of judicial power. Regardless of one's conception of sovereign immunity,1 45 the result is the
same: presumably, a judicial act entering a final judgment for the
United States.
The availability of sovereign immunity, therefore, neither offers a
reliable framework by which to categorize public rights nor justifies
their placement beyond the reach of "the judicial power of the United
States." 4 6 Sovereign immunity's presence in the public rights equation
generates more questions than it answers. Meanwhile, its absence
from the Court's more contemporary doctrinal formulations 47 leaves
one to wonder whether the conditional waiver of sovereign immunity
plays a meaningful role at all.1 48
B.

The Right-PrivilegeDichotomy

The historical distinction between rights and privileges, while
slightly more useful than the sovereign immunity rationale, is similarly dissatisfying with respect to doctrinal consistency. Indeed, its signiicance in the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence has been

142. See Young, supra note 29, at 792.
143. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675 (discussing "implied causes of action").
144. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
145. See Jessica Wagner, Waiver by Removal? An Analysis of State Sovereign Immunity,
102 VA. L. REV. 549, 560-68 (2016) (discussing the jurisdictional and substantive conceptions
of sovereign immunity).
146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
147. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985)
(holding that a mandatory private arbitration scheme for compensation claims by initial pesticide registrants against subsequent filers did not violate Article III); Wellness Int'l Network,
Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015) (permitting waiver of right to Article III tribunal for
claims unconstitutionally assigned for final adjudication by bankruptcy courts).
148. This rationale, of course, presumes the legitimacy and internal consistency of sovereign immunity, which itself rests on precarious doctrinal footing. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35
GEO. WASH. INT'LL. REV. 521, 521-22 (2003) (discussing the historical development of, doctrinal
gaps in, and need for reform of sovereign immunity "without reliance on the abstract or dignitary notions of sovereignty implicit in the very phrase 'sovereign immunity' ").
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anything but stable.1 4 9 And yet, though no longer a threshold test for
constitutional protection, the right-privilege distinction continues to
play some role in the amount of protection an interest is allottednamely, how much and what type of process is due.5 o It is important,
then, to consider what abiding influence, if any, it might have in the
context of agency adjudications.
The right-privilege argument essentially divides interests into
"rights" and "privileges." Somewhat tautologically, the former are said
to exist "as a matter of right."' 5 ' Examples include those rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, such as
life, liberty, property, and equal treatment under the law. 5 2 Privileges,
on the other hand, are "interests created by the grace of the state and
dependent for their existence on the state's sufferance." 5 3 These include economic and noneconomic interests alike, such as Social Security benefits, public employment, business licenses, or even entry into
the United States.1 5 4 Similar to the sovereign immunity rationale, the
right-privilege distinction maintains that the legislatively revocable
nature of privileges entitles their recipients to fewer procedural protections than those accorded to rights. 5 5 Accordingly, the adjudication
of such interests by non-Article III tribunals poses no threat to the
constitutional vestment of judicial power in Article III judges.
This view likewise lacks the substance of reliable doctrine. Three
critiques make this apparent. First, as with the sovereign immunity
rationale, the plain language of Article III suggests that it is the nature of the action-not the nature of the thing being adjudicated-that
makes it "judicial."15 6 An interest's revocability offers little insight into
the nature of the action that administrative and other non-Article III
bodies take-even if statutorily recognized as an adjudication-5 7
149.

See Adams v. United States, No. 00-447 C, 2003 WL 22339164, at *10 n.13 (Fed.

Cl. Aug. 11, 2003) (noting the rise, fall, and "partial return" of the right-privilege distinction).

150.

See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541-45 (1985) (overruling

the more categorical "bitter with the sweet" doctrine while endorsing "balancing of the competing interests at stake" to assess appropriate type and amount of process).
151.

Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in Constitu-

tional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69, 71 (1982).
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
153.

Smolla, supra note 151, at 71-72.

154.

Id.; see also William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction

in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1439-42 (1968) (providing a brief recapitulation of the right-privilege distinction as it concerns public sector employees).
155.

See Smolla, supra note 151, at 72-73.

156.
157.

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)-(7) (2012) (defining "order" as "the whole or a part of a

final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an
agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing" and "adjudication" as the
"agency process for the formulation of an order").
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concerning that interest. The right-privilege dichotomy thus gives us
no meaningful sense of the contours of Article III power.
Second, as with the sovereign immunity argument, the Supreme
Court's contemporary pragmatism concerning the metes and bounds
of public rights pays little mind to the right-privilege dichotomy.
Though "the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated"'15 8
does play a role in the Article III analysis, it appears to be a normative rather than a categorical one. The Court in Schor afforded the
state law claim a presumption of Article III necessity given its private nature. 5' 9 Yet the majority eschewed a bright-line approach in
favor of a sliding-scale one, finding the incidental effect of an administrative adjudication of such a right too minor to forbid-its private
nature notwithstanding.16 0
Finally, the doctrinal basis for the right-privilege distinction is itself incongruous with the concept of public rights recipients not being
entitled to an Article III forum. The separation of constitutionally protected rights from lesser-protected privileges was an attempt to limit
the reach of substantive due process.'' While individuals are afforded
constitutional protection of life, liberty, and property under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, "no one has a constitutional right to
government largess." 6 2 "This view," Professor Alstyne explains, "distinguishes the limited power of the state 'reasonably' to regulate activities conducted by private means without substantial assistance by
government from the unlimited power of the state to regulate advantages supplied by government without obligation." 6 3 For example,
the Constitution recognizes an individual's right to privacy that forbids a prohibition on the use of contraceptives 6 4 or undue interference
with abortion access.' 6 5 Even so, that right does not include an obligation to provide funding to indigent individuals who cannot afford these
things.16 6
158.
159.
160.

Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
See id. at 853.
See id. at 853-54.

161.

See Van Alstyne, supra note 154, at 1439-42.

162. Id. at 1442.
163. Id.
164. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972).
165. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
166. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977) (declining to extend Roe v. Wade to require states to fund abortions for indigent people); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27

(1980) (same); cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779-80 (2014) (conceding the existence of a compelling governmental interest in providing access, but not going
so far as to recognize a constitutional right to contraception for women).
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This distinction offers little guidance vis-A-vis public rights. If, for
instance, Congress passed a statute entitling those whose incomes fall
below a certain level to such funding, it is not clear that such an interest's status as a "privilege" permits Congress to place an alleged deprivation of that statutory interest beyond the reach of Article III
courts.
Another example of this incongruity is Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964," which prohibits employment discrimination based on an
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Notably,
these protections derive not from substantive due process, but from
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 69 Under the
right-privilege rubric, the right to be free from discriminatory treatment in the workplace appears to be a "privilege." It does not inhere in
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment right to due process-that is, employees do not have a constitutional right to federal protection against
employment discrimination. Nevertheless, Congress has never used
the potential revocability of Title VII to require claimants to forego
adjudication by an Article III tribunal-just the opposite. Title VII requires claimants to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and obtaining a right-to-sue letter.o But these are not limits on federal jurisdiction."' Moreover, the EEOC's role is not adjudicative; it is, at
most, investigative and prosecutorial.1 2
Neither the availability of sovereign immunity nor the classification of an interest as a "privilege" conclusively defines a public right.
Granted, many public rights matters involve claims against the federal government. Yet, as shown above, some do not. Similarly, while
public rights claims undoubtedly encompass a number of interests that
do not inhere in constitutional liberty, there are other such "privileges"
whose adjudication nevertheless require an Article III forum. But
these are common characteristics, not doctrinal frameworks. There

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17 (2012).
See id. § 2000e-2.
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) ("We hold that

filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver,
estoppel, and equitable tolling.").
172. Administrative exhaustion is often a formality. Claimants who have already retained counsel can file an administrative charge with the EEOC and immediately request a
Notice of Right to Sue in courts, which closes any investigation and forecloses the possibility of
the agency bringing charges. See Filing a Lawsuit, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/
lawsuit.cfm [https://perma.cc/34JH-GXVW].
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remains, then, a need to more clearly define the parameters of public
rights claims beyond these frequently recurring features.

IV.

ADMINISTRATIVE INJURIES

Recall the story with which this Article began. Denise receives a citation for which she must pay a fine unless she successfully challenges
it through the prescribed post-citation judicial process. Recall also the
cognitive dissonance between this commonly accepted policing regime
and the relative precariousness of an FTC adjudication against an alleged antitrust violator. Explanations for social acceptance of one and
antipathy toward the other abound. People obviously prefer brief traffic
stops. The amount and types of evidence used to prove such infractions
are generally limited and uncontroversial, and the financial stakes are
comparatively low. Surely then, this logic continues, the more highstakes, bureaucratic processes of administrative agencies are categorically distinct-a usurpation of judicial power, maybe. Yet social wanness hardly resolves the constitutional question of where the line ultimately lies between the adjudication effective law enforcement requires
and that which is reserved to Article III tribunals.
The theory of administrative injuries sands away at this friction.
Beginning with Justice Thomas's description of public rights as
'rights belonging to the people at large,' as distinguished from 'the private unalienable rights of each individual' " in Wellness International, 3 the theory of administrative injuries suggests that it is the
absence of a justiciable "case or controversy" that makes public rights
matters suitable for administrative (non-Article III) adjudication. This
Part then concludes by suggesting that it is the particularizing force
of a completed administrative action that converts a public right into
a justiciable claim entitled to full Article III protection.
In his Wellness Internationaldissent, Justice Thomas defined public rights by their generality.7 4 Private rights, by contrast, belong to
people qua people-namely, the "absolute" rights to life, liberty, and
property enshrined by the Constitution.' 7 5 "This distinction is significant to our understanding of Article III," he continued, "for while the
legislative and executive branches may dispose of public rights at will-including through non-Article III adjudications-an exercise of the
judicial power is required 'when the government want[s] to act authoritatively upon core private rights that had vested in a particular individual.' "176 Such a characterization of public rights appears relatively
173.
4 Wend.
174.
175.
176.

135 S. Ct. 1932, 1965-66 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Lansing v. Smith,
9, 21 (N.Y. 1829)).
See id at 1964-65.
Id. at 1965.
Id (quoting Nelson, supra note 123, at 569).
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unconcerned with the presence or absence of the government as an
original party to the dispute or even the revocability of any statute
pursuant to which a claim might arise. Instead, the essence of a public
right is its lack of particularity.
Herein lies the theoretical contribution of administrative injuries.
If generality is the defining feature of public rights, as Justice Thomas
suggests it historically is, it only seems fitting that an Article III court
not consider it-at least not in its initial generalized state. The Supreme Court's limited definition of an Article III "case or controversy"
and prudential doctrines of justiciability support this view. We cannot
use Article III courts to solicit legal advice."' Their judgments may not
be revised by Congress7 8 or the Executive Branch.'7 9 And cases must
be genuinely adversarial.'8 0 Article III courts guard against these concerns by using doctrines of justiciability, including standing, mootness,
ripeness, and political questions. Here, the Court's standing, ripeness,
and political question doctrines illustrate the non-justiciable nature of
public rights in the first instance.
A.

No Injury, No Standing

Article III courts may hear only those matters in which a claimant
has alleged a "personal injury [that is] fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and [is] likely to be redressed by the
requested relief."' 8 ' Of notable interest here is the injury requirement.
A claimant must show that she personally suffered an "injury in

177.

See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1911) (declining to issue advi-

sory opinions). But see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (upholding
provision of Voting Rights Act allowing states to seek declaratory judgments regarding the
legality of proposed changes to the Act); N. Cheyenne Tribes v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649
(1976) (affirming statute allowing tribes to sue for declaratory judgment that re-vestment of
land to tribes did not violate the Fifth Amendment).

178.

See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (holding that statute extend-

ing statute of limitations and reinstating cases dismissed with prejudice violated the constitutional separation of powers); cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanock, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (upholding reconstitution of the Court of Claims as an Article III court notwithstanding lack of judicial power
to compel the United States to pay money judgments if it chooses not to do so).

179.

See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) ("[B]y the Constitution, neither

the Secretary at War, nor any other Executive officer, nor even the Legislature, are authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this court.").

180.

See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304 (1943) (dismissing case for lack of

'genuine adversary issue between the parties, without which a court may not safely proceed

to judgment"). But see United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 761 (2013) (finding sufficient
adversity between the challenger to the Federal Defense of Marriage Act and challenger to
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, which defended the law when the Obama Administration declined to do so); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 204 (1958) (upholding the test case
challenging a bus segregation law).

181.

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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fact."
The Supreme Court defines this as "an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."1 8 3 Though there is
no threshold for severity 84 or requirement of economic harm,' 85 an injury to the general population falls short of an "injury-in-fact." 86 The
same goes for a speculative injury. 8 7
Now consider Denise. Suppose she actually had a passenger in her
car that would have legally entitled her to use the carpool bypass lane.
She arguably would have had a distinct, concrete interest in not being
wrongfully pulled over by the officer. Nevertheless, it is commonly accepted that the ability of officers to respond to traffic violations in a
summary fashion, as in this example, is essential for functional law
enforcement. Yet the theory of administrative injuries suggests that a
justiciable injury does not materialize until the citation is issued, however wrongfully.
The same logic holds with respect to the alleged antitrust violator
facing an FTC enforcement action, the Social Security applicant following the claim submission and internal review process, and even the
pesticide registrant in Union Carbide submitting to binding
182.

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

183. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003) (finding that an injury need be "'concrete,"distinct
and palpable,' and 'actual or imminent' ") (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155

(1990)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (holding that an injury is "distinct and
palpable").

184.

See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (recognizing standing for taxpayer

challenge to legislative expenditure as allegedly violating the Establishment Clause).

185.

See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) ("Aesthetic and environ-

mental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life
in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many
rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judi-

cial process."); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63 (same); Wright, 468 U.S. at 756 ("[Plaintiffs'] children's diminished ability to receive an education in a racially integrated school-is, beyond
any doubt, not only judicially cognizable but . .. one of the most serious injuries recognized
in our legal system.").

186.

See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974) (finding no injury-in-

fact based on "generalized grievance" that is "common to all members of the public" (citation

omitted)); cf. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998) (affirming injury's
status as "concrete" despite being "widely shared" when injury was based on political group's
failure to comply with public disclosure laws).
187. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (refusing taxpayer standing
based on relatively "remote, fluctuating and uncertain" interest in treasury funds); City of

Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (denying standing for equitable relief given
"speculative nature" of claim of future injury from police chokehold protocol); see also Clap-

per v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013) (refusing standing based on "highly
attenuated chain of possibilities" that fails to show "certainly impending" injury). But see

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342 (2014) (finding standing for equitable relief based on "sufficiently imminent" threat of future enforcement of false statement
statute against group).
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arbitration for determination of the proper allocation of fees. In each
instance, the would-be claimant lacks an actual, individualized injury
for which judicial redress might be sought. The company accused of
antitrust violations remains in its original position until the agency
completes its enforcement action. The same holds true for the Social
Security claimant, whose request for benefits is not officially denied
until the internal review process is complete and the final denial is
signed by the Commissioner. Even the claimant in Union Carbidewhose claim was against a private party that used its registration data
and thus bore a striking resemblance to a typical private rights
claim-still lacked a concrete injury for which Article III relief might
be sought until the administrative scheme finally deprived the company of an interest that the scheme aimed to provide.
The Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental
ProtectionAgency.. warrants consideration on this point. There, the
Court held that a state had standing to intervene in a suit in which
petitioners sought review of an EPA order denying a petition to regulate greenhouse gases linked to global warming.8 9 Though the "special
solicitude"'9 0 afforded to states undoubtedly played a role in the Court's
decision, the majority likewise acknowledged the existence of a "procedural right" for which the challengers to the EPA order were entitled
to seek a remedy.' 9 ' But such a right to challenge agency rulings was
not jeopardized until the agency had acted. Indeed, agency action-or
in Massachusettsv. EPA, inaction-caused the injury. 9 2
This acknowledgment of procedural rights in the justiciability analysis bolsters the view that a concrete injury manifests itself only after
the agency has completed its enforcement action. In challenging her
toll violation ticket, Denise invokes her procedural right to review of
the traffic officer's action. The same goes for the company facing antitrust penalties, the Social Security applicant facing a denial of benefits, and the pesticide registrant facing a denial of remuneration.
B. Almost, But Not Ripe
The Court's doctrine concerning ripeness further reinforces this
view. Ripeness guards against judicial cognizance of injuries that have
188. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
189. Id. at 510-14, 520-21.
190. Id. at 520.
191. Id. at 527-28; see also ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989) (finding
adverse state court judgment sufficient injury-in-fact to support standing in federal court).
192. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518 ("When a litigant is vested with a procedural
right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will
prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the

litigant.").
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not yet materialized. It is a temporal analysis that weighs "both the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration."' 93 In Abbott Laboratoriesv.
Gardner,for example, drug manufacturers challenged a Federal Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) rule requiring pharmaceutical companies to print a drug's "established name" on all labels and printed
materials to help consumers make an informed choice between
brand-name and generic products.1 9 4 Noting the "purely legal" nature
of the question-that is, whether the FDA correctly interpreted the
statute that the regulation was designed to implement'95 -as well as
the finality of the agency's action 9 6 and the significant costs associated with immediate compliance, 9 7 the Court found the challenge
ripe for Article III review.' 98
Like standing, ripeness is particularly concerned with avoiding the
adjudication of "hypothetical threats,"'99 which risks the grant of
poorly tailoredoo-or even inconsequentialo'-relief. Courts cannot
redress unripe injuries any more than a president can sign a bill into
law that Congress has not passed. To do so would be to risk the erosion
of the credibility upon which courts rely to effectuate their judgments.
Ripeness is a temporal bulwark against advisory opinions, and thus, a
key to institutional integrity. 202
Turning again to the abovementioned examples, ripeness underscores the imperative of a completed agency action before a public
rights matter may be deemed a "case or controversy." Though Denise
has an interest in never being stopped by a traffic officer except when
she is in fact violating the carpool-lane rule, the commonly accepted
realities of law enforcement make it impossible to preempt legally
193.

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); accord Regional Rail Reorganiza-

tion Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974) ('[R]ipeness is peculiarly a question of timing.

194. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 138-39.
195. Id. at 149.
196. Id. at 149-52.
197. Id. at 153-54 (the regulation requires plaintiffs to make "significant changes in their
everyday business practices").

198. Id. at 154.
199. See United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947).
200. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) ("[W]e can only speculate whether
respondents will be arrested, either again or for the first time, for violating a municipal ordinance or a state statute, particularly in the absence of any allegations that unconstitutional criminal statutes are being employed to deter constitutionally protected conduct.").

201. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 507 (1961) ("It is clear that the mere existence of
a state penal statute would constitute insufficient grounds to support a federal court's adjudication of its constitutionality in proceedings brought against the State's prosecuting officials if real threat of enforcement is wanting.").
202. See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148 ("[The ripeness doctrine's] basic rationale is to
prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . .").
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erroneous enforcement before it occurs. It goes without saying that a
court would be ill-equipped to award equitable relief to Denise before
she was pulled over. The same goes for the company facing FTC enforcement. What relief might a court grant a company faced with an
antitrust investigation before the FTC Commissioners issue a final determination? What if the enforcement action is ultimately dropped or
the agency finds in the company's favor? There is no government-imposed injury for the court to redress. To the contrary, any judicial intervention at this juncture undermines both the effectiveness of
agency enforcement and the court's ability to provide meaningful review of completed actions. Judicial intervention in the Social Security
application process would be similarly troublesome. Though the application and internal review processes may bear notable resemblance to
a judicial proceeding, it is ultimately a single action resulting either in
a grant or denial by the Commissioner. And finally, the pesticide registrant seeking compensation is not deprived of that compensation until the arbitrator makes her final determination. Only when the administrative scheme has injured a participant does judicial relief stand
to rectify a legal error in that process.
C.

The PoliticalQuestion of Agency Policy

One final doctrine affirms this conception of administrative adjudication as a necessary predicate to Article III intervention. The Court's
political-question jurisprudence concerns itself less with the temporal
status of a dispute than with the dispute's form. Unlike the other justiciability doctrines, a case presenting a political question is never justiciable, no matter how ripe or active the dispute or how great the personal or financial stake of the parties. 2 03 The judiciary essentially exists "to decide upon individual rights according to those principles
which the political departments of the nation have established." 2 0 4 Political questions thus properly rest with the political branches-or in
this case, their adjuncts. Of course, Article III hardly forestalls all disputes of political consequence. Indeed, judicial review requires courts
to wade into the political thicket quite regularly. Saying "what the law
isIso' requires courts to regulate constitutional boundaries, which

203.

See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012) (recognizing

that courts lack authority to decide political questions).

204. United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 711 (1832) (quotations omitted);
accord United States v. Boisdor6, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 63, 93 (1850) ("Our action is judicial. We
have no authority to exercise political jurisdiction and to grant, as the governors of Spain

had, and as Congress has."); see also Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 65-66 (1867)
(rejecting Guaranty Clause challenge to congressional action).

205.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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2 6
undoubtedly carries "political implications."o
Political questions en2
tail something more. 1o
The Court provided a comprehensive, modern formulation of the
doctrine in Baker v. Carr.208 Before Baker, the Court had taken a caseby-case approach that left litigants uncertain of its contours. The
Court thus took the case as an opportunity to distill the doctrine into
a prospectively useful framework.2 0 9 What emerged were six "analytical threads"210 that together comprised the political question doctrine:

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
'

question.2 1

Each of the Court's previous political question decisions involved at
least one of these issues.2 1 2 And this would be the rule going forward. 2 1 3
1. Agency Action as Policy Determination
The theory of administrative injuries concerns itself with Baker's
third thread. Agencies are, most fundamentally, policy-making bodies.
They exist not to create law, but to implement legislation in a manner
that adheres to the congressional objective it was adopted to execute.
Granted, the line between legislating and policymaking is a fine one.
During the New Deal Era-which gave us administrative agenciesthe Supreme Court wrestled to fit these seemingly new bodies into the
constitutional scheme. 2 1 4 In fact, that struggle is still known to
206. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942-43 (1983).
207. See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 196 ("[Judicial review] will sometimes involve the '[r]esolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches,'
but courts cannot avoid their responsibility merely 'because the issues have political implications.'" (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 943 (citation omitted))).
208. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
209. See id.
210. Id. at 211.
211. Id. at 217.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421, 431 (1935) (rejecting the
National Industrial Recovery Act's (NIRA) delegation of power to the President to institute
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resurface from time to time.215 Fortunately, this Article requires a degree of abstraction that avoids this increasingly granular tug-of-war.
What matters here is this basic structure: (1) Congress decides to solve
a problem by passing a law enlisting the assistance of an administrative agency; (2) that law necessarily contains an "intelligible principle"
to which the agency may reasonably adhere without exercising legislative power; and (3) the agency sets the agenda for carrying out that
mission.2 1 6

Agencies typically use two policy-making tools: rulemaking and adjudication.2 " Though the rulemaking function tends to embody the
breadth typically associated with policy development, adjudication
serves as both a necessary complement2 " and an independent source
of agency policymaking.2 19 The need for this flexibility is critical to administrative effectiveness. Where the issue is sufficiently foreseeable
and comprehensible, agencies may see fit to promulgate a concrete,
prospective rule.220 Yet not every issue fits this neat, methodical mold.
Other problems are dynamic, unpredictable, and thus ill-suited to the
"rigidifying" approach of rulemaking.22 ' In other words, adjudication
may be the only effective means by which an agency might execute its
policymaking objectives.
the Petroleum Code); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-39
(1935) (rejecting NIRA's delegation of power to the President to create Code of Fair Compe-

tition); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 422, 425-26 (1944) (affirming delegation of
broad powers for the President to establish price controls as "war emergency measure").
215. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S.
607, 641 (1980) (limiting power of Labor Secretary to set standards for benzene exposure);

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (upholding power of U.S. Sentencing
Commission to promulgate Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Whitman v. Am. Trucking As-

socs., 531 U.S. 457, 474-76 (2001) (affirming EPA power under Clean Air Act to set air quality
standards).

216.

See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1928).

217. See generally Glen 0. Robinson, The Making ofAdministrative Policy: Another Look
at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative ProcedureReform, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
485 (1970) (examining the interplay between rulemaking and adjudication in response to
calls for procedural reform); David L. Shapiro, The Choice ofRulemaking or Adjudication in
the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965) (evaluating the two
primary processes of agency policymaking and suggesting that rulemaking has not been used
to its full potential).
218.

See Charles H. Koch Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA.

L. REV. 693, 696-700 (2005); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 9293 (1943) (calling for agency to promulgate pre-enforcement "standards of conduct"); Nat'l

Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 675-77 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (affirming FTC
rulemaking power to define standards for the statute it was created to enforce through
adjudication).
219.

See Koch Jr., supra note 218, at 696-700; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery

II), 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
220. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202.
221. See id. at 202-03.
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Such is the case with public rights matters. To be sure, though the
Supreme Court has invoked Baker in several legal areas,2 2 2 the ruling
has largely lent itself to the analysis of the justiciability of vote-dilution matters under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 2 3 Nevertheless, the
Court in its review of agency adjudications of public rights closely reflects Baker's call for judicial restraint when non-judicial policy expertise is needed. Enter Chevron and Auer deference.
2. Justiciabilityand the Need for Deference
The point at which congressional policymaking ends and "the judicial power of the United States" begins is hardly obvious. 2 2 4 Deferential
doctrines like Chevron help preserve this crucial division of labor.
Though it is currently facing an onslaught of judicial, academic, and
even political criticism, 225 the two-step framework laid out in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council226 remains the lawAnd for good reason. When an agency interprets its organic statute,
reviewing courts first ask whether the provision at issue is ambiguous,
and if it is, whether the agency's interpretation is a reasonable one.2 2 1
Put differently, unless Congress has spoken directly to the precise issue in question, Chevron directs courts to defer to agencies so long as
their interpretations are reasonable.2 2 8 Such deference is premised on
agencies' critical roles as expert policymakers in their respective
fields.2 2 9 Even before Chevron, the Supreme Court understood that
"[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation

222. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofskyv. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012) (discussing
foreign and diplomatic affairs); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (discussing
impeachment proceedings); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983) (discussing deportation
procedure).

223. See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 310 (2004); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 268 (2003); Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109, 118 (1986).
224. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
225. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (foregoing Chevron in the
face of a question of "deep economic and political significance") (internal quotation marks
omitted); Michael Macagnone, House Passes Bill Ending Chevron Deference, LAW360 (Jan.
11, 2017, 8:55 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/879235/house-passes-bill-endingchevron-deference [https://perma.cc/ZD9D-DKPA]; Ilya Somin, Gorsuch is Right About
Chevron Deference, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/25/gorsuch-is-right-about-chevron-defeence/?utm_

term=.3ff73ldfbl91 [https://perma.cc/8CLS-2ZAY].
226. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
227. Id.
228. See id. at 844-45.
229. See id. at 865 ("Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government.").
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of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." 2 3 0 The Court affirmed this principle in Chevron. 2 3 1 When it comes to the proper execution of a "technical and complex" regulatory scheme, the policy disputes that inevitably arise are
better left "to legislators or administrators, not to judges." 2 3 2
Consistent with Baker's call for restraint when faced with issues
requiring "an initial policy determination" by a political body, Chevron
deference recognizes agencies as at least a subdivision of the political
sphere, and therefore entitled to similar respect. 2 3 3 Unlike judgeswho are neither subject-matter experts nor elected officials-administrative agencies offer both specialization and (indirect) political accountability. 2 34 Though the Court, as the political question doctrine
similarly recognizes, cannot avoid outright the reconciliation of adverse political interests, Chevron deference checks the impulses of
judges who might otherwise seek to substitute their policy judgments
for those of the experts selected by the political branches. 2 35
The same logic undergirds the Court's analysis of agencies' interpretations of their own regulatory pronouncements, or AuerlSeminole
Rock deference. In such cases, "the ultimate criterion is the
230.
231.

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The wisdom or effectiveness of Chevron in ful-

filling this aim is debatable, to be sure. Ever since the decision, the Court has struggled to
maintain a consistent formulation of this seemingly simple doctrine. In applying the first
step of Chevron, the Court has used traditional interpretive canons and special factors alike
to find clarity where ambiguity seems inevitable. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) ("extraordinary cases"); Dep't. of Hous. & Urban Dev.

v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130-31 (2002) (textual clarity); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 594 (2004) (purposive clarity). Meanwhile, step two's call for deference
to reasonable interpretations has fostered minimal consensus among the justices. See, e.g.,

AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 395 (1999) (disputing reasonableness of FCC's
'pick and choose" rule as interpretation of the Telecommunications Act); Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715, 755 (2006) (disputing the reasonableness of the Army Corps of Engineers' interpretation of "navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act). This does not even
begin to cover the Court's more recent disputes concerning the scope of Chevron's domain

altogether. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (refusing to
apply Chevron where Congress did not intend to give agency interpretations the "force of

law"); Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)
(extending deference to changes in agency interpretations, even if previously reached by a

court); City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013) (expanding Chevron to include statutory interpretations concerning agency jurisdiction). But this Article is not concerned with Chevron's normative value. Rather, Chevron captures the Court's reluctance to
involve itself with the substantive policy-related aspects of the administrative process.

232. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-65.
233. Id. at 863; Baker, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
234. See Chevron, 467 U.S at 865-66; Pauley ex rel. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,
501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) ("Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the statutes it is authorized to implement reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles
of the political and judicial branches.").

235.

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
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administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."23 6
Like Chevron, Auer deference assumes that agencies are best positioned to resolve the ambiguities that require a certain degree of policy
expertise. 237 This seems particularly logical when agencies are attempting to clarify the meaning of their own prior pronouncements.
Though critics may be right to question Auer's doctrinal wisdom, 23 8 its
purpose remains closely intertwined with the Court's aversion to answering political questions. While it has taken some time to get a complete explanation, 2 39 the Court has ultimately acknowledged that Auer
deference, like Chevron deference, respects agencies as political adjuncts better suited than judges at making politically divisive policy
decisions. 240 It similarly appreciates the "unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives" that agencies possess relative to courts. 2 4 ' Given
agencies' technical prowess and political accountability, it naturally
follows that they are best positioned to say what they mean when their
regulations need further explanation. 2 42
As in Chevron, the Court in Auer is equally troubled by the political
implications of revisiting the policy decisions of administrative
236.

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); accord Auer v. Rob-

bins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (agency interpretation is "controlling unless plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation") (internal quotation marks omitted).
237. Also, like Chevron, the Auer doctrine has been the subject of much disagreement on
the Supreme Court in the last decade. See generally Michael P. Healy, The Past, Presentand
Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and Function in JudicialReview of Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 62 KAN. L. REV. 633 (2014) (examining the Court's recent reformulation of Auer deference). Indeed, Justice Scalia, who wrote for the Court in Auer, later seized
several opportunities to call for the complete abandonment of the doctrine before his death

in 2016. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211-12 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616-23 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nevertheless, as with Chevron, this Article is concerned
less with the Auer's staying power than it is with the doctrine's purpose of leaving undisturbed those initial policy judgments made by these adjunct political bodies.
238. See, e.g., Decker, 568 U.S. at 621 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("In any case, however great may be the efficiency gains derived from Auer deference,
beneficial effect cannot justify a rule that not only has no principled basis but contravenes
one of the great rules of separation of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its
violation."); John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructureand JudicialDeference to Agency InterpretationsofAgency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 681-85 (1996) (calling for an independent judicial check on agency interpretations of their own regulations); Kevin M. Stack, Inter-

pretingRegulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 371-74 (2012) (addressing AuerlSeminole Rock's
inadequacy).
239.

Manning, supra note 238, at 629.

240.
241.

See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565-68 (1980).
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991).

242. See Manning, supra note 238, at 630 ("[W]hen an agency interprets a regulation
that it has promulgated (the usual situation), the Court has found the presumption of binding deference particularly justified because of the agency's superior competence to understand and explain its own regulatory text." (footnote omitted)).

2019]

ADMINISTRATIVE INJURIES

163

agencies. This goes beyond the pragmatic considerations that assume
a degree of primacy in these doctrines of administrative deference. Indeed, it is axiomatic that courts refrain from questioning these "initial
policy determinations" that agencies in their adjudicative function necessarily reach. 24 3 By making these determinations non-justiciable, the
political question doctrine likewise respects the non-judicial features
of agency adjudications. In the specific context of reviewing agency adjudications, deferential doctrines like Chevron and Auer aim to preserve the Judiciary's role as guardian of process while minimizing, as
much as possible, the allure of substituting one questionable policy
judgment for another.
3.

Spanning the Legal-PoliticalDivide

Though admittedly far from perfect, these doctrinal structureslike those of ripeness and standing-underscore the non-justiciable
nature of administrative claims on which the proper agency has not
yet passed. By fulfilling the need for a non-judicial policy determination inherent in many agency adjudications, a completed agency action-properly cloaked in the Court's deferential analytical framework-sheds a case of the component that originally made it non-justiciable. Had a court taken it up in the first instance, the court would
have necessarily ventured into the political realm delegated by Congress to the agency. The FTC would be less empowered to carry out its
crucial policymaking mission to protect American consumers were it
deprived of its initial adjudicative function. The same goes for the Social Security Administration. Parsing the individual situation of each
benefit applicant allows the agency to shape policy by balancing its
mission of providing financial protection to retirees, individuals with
disabilities, and survivors with the political realities of limited revenue and high public expectations.
Once again, there is little daylight between these examples and
Denise's situation. The officer who ultimately decides to fine Denise
for taking the bypass lane must engage in a sophisticated calculation
to which courts would be ill-suited. The officer must not only make the
split-second assessment of whether Denise is indeed complying with
or violating the law, but also consider the costs and benefits of enforcement in that situation. Enforcement could cause the officer to miss another, more effective means of implementing departmental policy
against misuse of carpool lanes. Unlike a serial abuser who seizes
every opportunity to take the bypass lane, Denise has a rather sympathetic story that leaves her less likely to become a repeat offender.
These and other policy considerations are part of an officer's average
workday. The inability to seize every possible opportunity to fulfill its
243.

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

164

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:129

core mission forces law enforcers-from the local sheriff to the head of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau-to make calculations that
are cognizant of political realities from which courts should abstain
until those determinations are at least initially settled.
Administrative injuries as an analytical framework recognizes this
additional attribute of public rights that sovereign immunity and the
right-privilege distinction fail to recognize. Namely, the interests inherent in policy judgments are, to borrow from Justice Thomas and
Justice Scalia, held by the public more generally. 244 Only after those
policy determinations have been made through the course of an individualized adjudication does the public nature of the right at issue sufficiently fade and get replaced with a private interest in procedural
justice. In a word, the administrative injury privatizes the formerly
public right.
In sum, standing, ripeness, and political questions comprise the essence of administrative injuries. First, these doctrines highlight both
the normative and constitutional precarity of critiques which conflate
agency adjudications with Article III judicial power. The absence of a
concrete, articulable injury prior to the completion of an agency enforcement action would lay waste to the critical functions that the socalled administrative state has come to play in American life. Furthermore, judicial intervention prior to the manifestation of an administrative injury would threaten the legitimacy of courts' institutional
role to "say what the law is." 2 4 5
Second, these justiciability doctrines elucidate a common theoretical thread running through the Court's seemingly erratic jurisprudence on this issue. Though never explicitly referenced, the Court's
deference to administrative schemes that have defied prior notions of
sovereign immunity or the right-privilege dichotomy nevertheless appears to respect the notion that agency adjudications are more-or-less
equivalent to commonly accepted notions of law enforcement. The
agency, like the traffic officer, specializes in non-justiciable matters.
Third, through the lens of administrative injuries, these justiciability limits affirm the political reality of public rights that other explanations never fully acknowledged. What makes public rights "general"

244.

See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1965 (2015) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting) ("[W]hile the legislative and executive branches may dispose of public rights at
will-including through non-Article III adjudications-an exercise of the judicial power is
required 'when the government want[s] to act authoritatively upon core private rights that
had vested in a particular individual.' " (citations omitted)); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 68 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is clear that what we meant by public
rights were not rights important to the public, or rights created by the public, but rights of
the public--that is, rights pertaining to claims brought by or against the United States.").

245.

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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is not their possession by everyone. For example, all people have a
right to life-a seemingly private right subject to procedural due process protections. 24 6 Rather, the public nature of the right is in the broad
public policy implications that each administrative action carries-no
matter how mundane or seemingly individualized. The concept of administrative injuries does away with public and private rights as separate and distinct universes by revealing that they are really just
points along the continuum of law and public policy upon which agencies merely serve as a catalyst.
D. Why Administrative InjuriesMatter
As with all theoretical models, the lingering question is one of practical utility. Is the theory of administrative injuries a solution in
search of a problem, or does it resolve-or at least begin to resolve-a
point of friction in the law, and accordingly benefit the public to some
degree? The recent uptick in public wariness toward administrative
agencies suggests that it does. 24 7
First, by comparing agency activities to the widely accepted practices of local law enforcement, administrative injuries demonstrate the
important policy work that agencies perform in the American legal
system. Like the traffic officer, agencies perform tasks for which neither courts nor legislators would prove an adequate substitute. While
one would be justified to criticize agencies when they "promulgate
mush," 2 4 8 or similarly, to deplore the passage of vague statutes that
leave agencies to perform lawmakers' primary duties, the proper response may well be a modest surgical fix, not the complete demolition
of the administrative state.
Second, the theory of administrative injuries offers courts a more
fulsome framework by which to analyze public rights matters. For too
long, the Court has opted to refer to public rights as a self-evident and
246.

See Smolla, supra note 151, at 72.

247. See, e.g., PHILIP WALLACH, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE'S LEGITIMACY CRISIS (Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings, Apr. 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Administrative-state-legitimacy-crisisFINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YY5H-5NQJ]; Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight
for "Deconstruction of the Administrative State", WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-for-deconstruction-

of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-1

1e6-bf0l-d47f8cf9b643_story.html?

utmterm=.b750f96edf78 [https://perma.cc/TMP9-K5KV]; Sean Moran, 20 Ways Trump Unraveled the Administrative State, BREITBART (Apr. 11, 2017), http://www.breitbart.com/
big-government/2017/04/11/20-ways-trump-unraveled-administrative-state/ [https://perma.cc/
Q5RK-ZEQF]; Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Pulling the Administrative State Off Autopilot,
WASH. TIMES (May 2, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/2/
reducing-regulations-will-help-business/ [https://perma.cc/V29W-9FLG].

248. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
abrogated by Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
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self-defining concept that warrants little explanation. This doctrinal
default has spawned varied and often conflicting understandings of
public rights among the justices. The theory of administrative injuries
speaks to those concerns expressed by the justices who have taken
time to elaborate their public rights rationales while filling in the gaps
left by existing explanations.
Third, the concept of administrative injuries carves out a useful
backstop as both the Court and Congress set their sights on Cheron.249
Even if doctrinal reform is the ultimate answer, it is important for
judges, lawmakers, and the public alike to recognize Chevron's political dimension. Doctrinal reform may prove useful, to be sure. But leaving courts to interpret the same statutes that agencies currently interpret and administer would cede an inordinate amount of policymaking
power to the branch of government that lacks both the technical expertise and the political accountability of administrative agencies.
Merely doing away with Chevron as some critics have suggested would
shift that political accountability even further away from the elected
officials ultimately responsible for creating and overseeing these agencies. Meanwhile, Article III's limits on the justiciability of political
questions would likely prevent courts from venturing into the void left
by Chevron's sudden absence. The mushier the statute, the more politically rife (and less justiciable) the controversies it is likely to generate. Reformers would thus do well to exercise caution.
V.

CONCLUSION

The theory of administrative injuries is hardly meant to resolve the
public rights discussion. To the contrary, it aims to revitalize it.
Though the notion that public rights do not require an Article III tribunal in the first instance is well-established, the Court's quest to define the contours of such rights has been slow-going (not to mention
inconsistent) at best, and willfully obscurant at worst. This in turn has
led to an uncertain constitutional footing for some of our nation's most
vital institutions. This Article attempts to highlight a common theme
in the Court's public rights jurisprudence by proposing a new lens
249. See Eric Citron, The Roots and Limits of Gorsuch's Views on Chevron Deference,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2017, 11:26 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/roots-limitsgorsuchs-views-chevron-deference/ [https://perma.cc/8SV8-DBD3]; Connor Raso, Congress May
Tell Courts to Ignore Regulatory Agencies' Reasoning, But Will It Matter?, BROOKINGS (Jan. 27,
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/congress-may-tell-courts-to-ignore-regulatoryagencies-reasoning-but-will-it-matter/ [https://perma.cc/UAP8-BTLN]; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Agencies Decide Law? Doctrine May Be Tested at Gorsuch Hearing, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/business/dealbook/neil-gorsuch-chevrondeference.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8VW7-SEAP]; see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct.
1348, 1358 (2018) ("[W]hether Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for another
day."); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1628 (2018) ("No party to these cases has
asked us to reconsider Chevron deference. But even under Chevron's terms, no deference is
due." (citation omitted)).
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though which we might assess the limits of administrative power. By
revisiting longstanding and widely accepted functions of everyday law
enforcement, this Article recasts administrative functions in a similar
light. It begins by distinguishing simple adjudication from exercises of
Article III judicial power; that is, while an exercise of judicial power
involves adjudication, not all adjudications require an exercise of judicial power. Without going so far as to define the judicial power, the
theory of administrative injuries proposes that the proper line between
the two rests not with the composition of the parties to the original
dispute or the judicial fiction of the right-privilege dichotomy, but with
the formation of a justiciable injury.
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